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Tenterfield Revisited I 
Coming down the street 
In his out-of-date carriage, 
The trot of the hoofs 
In a rat-a-tat barrage, 
Old Henry Parkes, 
In his big top hat. 
His lion-like head. 
Eyes like a sword. 
Blazing in a thought, 
Blazing at affront, 
Blazing for a word — 
But. in-drawn, still, and cold as the ice, 
as vision-held he sat, and saw 
Commonwealth and Empire, brotherly and brother. 
This State and that State, all linked together. 
For Parkes had a vision, 
And the vision came true; 
And Pitt Street, Macquarie Street, 
Never shall forget 
That great old man coming down the way, 
Coming into Sydney like a king! 
Marv Gilmore 
It is exactly 100 years and six days since Sir Henry Parkes, 
Premier of New South Wales, made his famous speech at 
Tenterfield, which sparked the conflagration of events 
throughout the 1890s, culminating in AustraHa's indepen-
dence and Federation in 1901. Parkes and his colony had 
not been partners in the Federal Council of Australasia and 
other previous attempts to bring the Australian colonies to-
gether. He believed these efforts too flimsy and waited until 
he could seize the opportunity for a wholehearted drive 
aimed at true nationalism. 
The significance of Tenterfield, of course, is that it lies 
just across the border from Queensland. Parkes had been to 
Queensland to sound out opinion on both sides of politics 
and waited until he was on New South Wales soil, in the 
midst of his own constituents, before making his utterances. 
On 24 October 1889, at Tenterfield, Parkes proposed a con-
ference of politicians which would appoint a convention of 
leading men from all the colonies — delegates appointed by 
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the authority of Parliament who would fully represent the 
opinion of the different colonies. The convention would 
design a constitution which would create a federal Parlia-
ment and federal government for the conduct of national 
business. 
It was on 30 October, 101 years ago tomorrow, that 
Parkes wrote to his old adversary, the Victorian Premier, 
Gillies, making a definite proposition for the summoning of 
a convention. The Victorian was diffident; Victorians al-
ways are when it comes to relations with New South Wales, 
whether it be in politics, football, beer, television, educa-
tion systems or railway gauges. Indeed, it is still symbolic 
that concepts of national unity in Australia did not receive 
any dramatic boost until the driving in of the last spike on 
the Sydney/Melbourne railway at Albury on the border of 
our two dominant colonies. If the River Murray could talk it 
would whisper the story of Federation, a story of the artery 
of a continent which, through a stroke of a pen in the Colo-
nial Office in London, became the border of three of the fun-
damental colonies and the scene of wrangles and disputes 
over riparian rights, inter-colonial poaching of business, in-
compatible duck-shooting seasons, the depredations of the 
fruit fly, and what was described as the "lion in the path" of 
Federation which federalists must either slay or be slain by 
— the issue of inter-colonial tariffs which made Victoria 
protectionist and New South Wales free trade. Those vital 
pieces of our European heritage, the old customs houses on 
the Murray River, stand today as sentinels reminding us of 
how visionaries travelling on the path to nationhood can be 
slowed by invisible barriers of parochialism, economic self-
interest and fear of the future. 
Parkes prevailed over his Victorian counterpart; logic 
and the tide of events saw to that. And his scheme, 
crystallised in embryonic form in Tenterfield, con-
ceptualised in the principles he put to that first Constitu-
tional Convention in Sydney in March 1890, became the 
driving force of the 1890s. In his own words: 
The scheme of federal government, it is assumed, would neces-
sarily follow close upon the type of the Dominion Government 
of Canada. It would provide for the appointment of a Cover-
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nor-General, for the creation of a Privy Council, and a Parlia-
ment consisting of a Senate and a House of Commons. In the 
work of the Convention, no doubt, the rich stores of political 
knowledge which were collected by the framers of the Consti-
tution of the United States, would be largely resorted to, as well 
as the vast accumulations of learning on cognate subjects since 
that time.' 
Thus the spirit of the decade of the 1890s began and, like 
all of the world's reformist/revolutionary movements in 
human endeavour, a variety of ingredients was present: the 
vagaries of economic boom and depression; the birth of the 
world's first Labor Party which, as Crisp reminds us, was to 
change the nature of the constitutional debate;^ the writing 
efforts of intellectuals and pamphleteers, the Australian Na-
tives Association; the consequences of profound clashes be-
tween capital and labour, Irish and English, farmer and 
manufacturer. Catholic and Protestant, republican and 
monarchist — all of those were present. So too was the cul-
tural force of the novelist, the poet, the artists, musician and 
architect to translate, influence and enhance a milieu condu-
cive to change. Politicians who became statesmen steered 
that change towards 1901. 
So it transpired in 1901 that a nation came of age with a 
written constitution that created the political anatomy and 
most of the physiology of its life force. Parkes's design pre-
vailed, by and large. It was a constitutional monarchy with 
a thin umbilical cord reaching to London and a federal sys-
tem modelled heavily on that of the United States of Amer-
ica: a pouring into one cup of a blend of the two mutually 
repugnant flavours, Westminster-style responsible govern-
ment and American federalism, and, for the cream, a Swiss-
style amending formula. Such a formula was bound to 
produce headaches. The founding fathers rejected the Cana-
dian design and opted for the American and Germanic pat-
tern of strong states and a weak federal government which 
most of them believed would remain small and exist primar-
ily on the smell of an oil rag, viz. one-quarter of customs and 
excise revenue. Profound hopes were pinned on the federal 
Upper House, the Senate — a states house — as the key in-
strument for influencing national policy. It fitted Dicey's^ 
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prescription of "Union without Unity " beautifully, and on 
paper was decidedly decentralist. Moreover, there was no 
recognition — in fact negative recognition — for the origi-
nal Aboriginal inhabitants. 
Ninety years have followed and Australia has undergone 
profound change which has tested the framework of our 
political system to its utmost. Two world wars, three boom 
periods and a depression have seen the role of government 
proliferate; lateral thinking in economic policy has seen 
governments accept a positive role in economic manage-
ment; economic growth with commensurate burgeoning 
transport and communications requirements has trans-
gressed state borders and called forth a scale of government 
involvement necessary in one of the largest continents on 
earth with such a small population that the private sector 
had been unable or unwilling to provide its infrastructure 
requirements. In short, governments in Australia today have 
considerably wider responsibilities than they possessed in 
the Victorian era when our constitution was formed and 
when the test of good government was small government 
and balanced budgets. This growth of government has 
posed threats to the capacity of our democratic institutions 
to scrutinise and control the executive, and doubts have 
arisen about the impact of these changes on protection of 
civil liberties. 
Most significantly, the balance of power in the Australian 
federal system has been profoundly tipped almost 180 de-
grees from the intentions of the founding fathers. The 
causes are not hard to find. The sheer growth of the public 
sector has led to overlapping and duplication between lev-
els of government and between units of government at the 
one level. So too has the very definition of government ser-
vices and all important linkages between them. The mobil-
ity of people, goods, ideas, concepts and financial 
transactions means that they can no longer be confined to 
the boundaries of geographical jurisdictions of state and 
local governments. Most importantly, the internationalisa-
tion of Australia in fields to do with economic, social, lab-
our, environment, health, education and human rights has 
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produced a centripetal force in the federation whereby the 
federal government has assumed more power to speak and 
act on behalf of Australia in international forums, often 
thereby assuming a policy role in areas formally reserved to 
the states in Section 51 and elsewhere in the constitution. 
There have also been shifts of power through some amend-
ments. High Coun interpretation, direct unconstitutional 
action, co-operative arrangements and — more powerful 
than any other force — federal financial relationships. 
To make a selective stocktake of Australia's position in 
1990, this is: 
• a nation of just 17 million people in an enormous conti-
nent at the southern end of the archipelago of civilisation 
sitting atop Antarctica, located in the fastest growing eco-
nomic region of the world — the Asia Pacific region; 
• a nation with no major cultural divisions by international 
standards; 
• one of the few major nations never to have had a full civil 
war; 
• a soceity where the word ' 'equality" is the most powerful 
force in the political lexicon. Australians believe that they 
are entitled to the same standard of government services 
wherever they may live. There will be no locational dis-
advantage for them, and the result is an elaborate laby-
rinth of fiscal, economic and social poUcies which 
address this aim, most clearly symbolised in our unique 
Commonwealth Grants Commission, created in 1933, 
the most sophisticated process of horizontal equalisation 
in the world. 
• co-ordination of loan borrowing and public infrastruc-
ture provision through another unique institution, the 
Australian Loan Council, added by referendum to our 
constitution in 1927;^* 
• a formal division of power which is different from many 
other federal systems with, for example, the federal gov-
ernment having little direct power over prices and in-
comes, or the railways, unHke most other federal 
systems; 
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• public services with high standards of conduct and admi-
rable records of devotion to the nation. These include de-
partments and government business enterprises which, 
despite occasional and notable but isolated failures, are 
producing efficient and effective service across enor-
mous distances which pose significant engineering, eco-
nomic and social challenges. 
The shortcomings of our federal system have been well 
documented and are familiar to scholars and practitioners, 
but in the 1990s a number of aspects have already begun to 
emerge as being of particular significance, especially for the 
economy. These are: 
• the highest degree of vertical fiscal imbalance in the 
world. The federal government collects some 80 percent 
of the revenue. The states are dependent on federal trans-
fers for 50 per cent on average of their budget revenue. 
Local government is also heavily dependent on transfers 
for its funding. All round, it is a recipe for a lack of politi-
cal accountability and constant buck-passing. As 
Mathews and Jay remind us, it is the worst of all worlds,'' 
with the divorcing of taxation from expenditure func-
tions which will always distort responsibility. In the re-
sultant clash of political wills between federal and state 
governments, the fact that the public sector as a whole is 
crowding out the private sector may be overlooked; 
• a decline in political accountability as overlapping and 
duplication occur between levels of government in deliv-
ery of goods and services; 
• decreasing uniformity, portability and accessibility for 
government and private goods and services; 
• damage to Australia's overseas image and trading pros-
pects through confusion over policies between govern-
ments; 
• hindrances to micro-economic reform, especially as the 
task of providing infrastructure to industry is frag-
mented; 
• decreased policy harmonisation in both taxation and ex-
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penditure, leading to mitigation of the effects of policy 
emanating from one government by the actions of an-
other; 
• proliferation of executive federalism through ministerial 
councils, inter-governmental agreements and meetings 
which now occupy over one-quarter of the public sector 
in more than 150 major meetings per year and over 350 
individual agreements concluded away from the normal 
channels of democratic scrutiny;*^ 
• misplaced perceptions of levels of government, including 
wrangles over conditional funding, equalisation princi-
ples and political kudos for programs with a resultant 
scant regard for needs of cHents to be served, and zones 
of anarchy or policy vacuums where needs in the com-
munity are not even recognised. 
These problems are symptomatic of the failings of the late 
nineteenth century-designed model of government to cope 
with life in the fast lane of the late twentieth century. Out of 
it all, the blend of Westminster principles with federalism is 
not working, the executive has dominated the legislatures 
of both national and state levels of government, and the bal-
ance of power has shifted so far to the federal government 
that many analysts question whether Australia, like Austria, 
is federated in name only. These symptoms are fanned by a 
peculiar media industry in Australia which is itself a federa-
tion. With no network television news in Australia, only 
one and a half national radio networks and only two low-
circulation national newspapers, the media itself is struc-
tured along the lines of the federal system and fans the 
divisiveness of federal-state relations to excite its readership 
or audience or viewers, because their circulation or ratings 
zone coincides with the electorate of state governments. 
Compounding all of these difficulties is the sheer fact that 
our system of government rests on an electorate so poorly 
educated in citizenship, so little aware of the functions, 
structure and roles of the components of the political pro-
cess as to make Australians a reactive rather than a proactive 
force, easily exploited for their ignorance, easily turned 
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cynical and, despite the unique existence of compulsory 
voting, or perhaps because of it, causing them to become a 
mass of apathy and thereby an impediment to change and 
reform. 
A vision of Australia 
It is against this background that reforms of Australia's sys-
tem of government have to be contemplated. Political re-
form, like every other kind of reform, draws from past 
experience, but also requires some vision of the final desti-
nation, together with appropriate methodology for assess-
ment of the reform process. The methodology adopted here 
is a combination of historical experience, theoretical con-
structs and conceptualisation, comparative empirical analy-
sis of experience in other systems and assessment of 
implementation practicalities. 
The vision of a future Australia is not difficult to formu-
late. Many of the aims and objectives of the founding fathers 
are still relevant. They desired a democratic, independent 
system of government which would foster nationhood, an 
ingredient so necessary in the 1890s — a continent for a na-
tion, and a nation for a continent. However, there are sev-
eral additional ingredients required for the twenty-first 
century. Australia needs a protective democracy, not a pas-
sive democracy, a democracy where the three perennial 
"E"s prevail: those three words so beloved by over fifteen 
major royal commissions and inquiries into the constitution 
and the Australian public sector during the twentieth cen-
tury — equity, efficiency and effectiveness. The system 
must be dynamic in its political processes and the nation 
needs to be happy; yes, happy, in the sense of creating har-
mony and co-operation, free from the tensions which pre-
vail so easily in multicultural societies with inadequate 
avenues for expression and focus of interests, checks and 
balances. It has been observed by Canadian scholars that 
whereas the United States Constitution mentions the aspira-
tions of Americans as being "life, liberty and the pursuit of 
individual happiness", constitutions such as the Canadian 
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and Australian documents speak rather of' 'peace, order and 
good government". There is little joy in the Australian Con-
stitution. 
Of course, a significant difference in circumstances faces 
the 1990s and its founding fathers and amending mothers. 
Whereas the 1890s were all about nationalism, the 1990s 
are all about internationalism. Australia's system of govern-
ment is in dire need of reform to make AustraUa internation-
ally competitive economically, internationally active 
socially and politically, and a positive contributor to inter-
national relations and the universality of humankind. No-
where is this more evident than in the impact of trends in 
the globalisation of business, communications and the envi-
ronment, where challenges to Australian sovereignty, flexi-
biUty and adaptability have emerged so rapidly and will 
never abate as the world for the rest of the 1990s settles 
down into regional trading and political blocs following the 
turn of events in the Soviet Union, Western Europe post-
1992. North American free trade agreements between the 
United States, Canada and Mexico, and the slowly blossom-
ing Asia/Pacific regional grouping. The constitution and the 
political system need adaptation. Statesmen of the 1890s 
had to be nationalists; statespersons of the 1990s must be in-
ternationalists. 
Where to begin and which elements to choose as exam-
ples, for the list is long? A young nation like Australia, pre-
sented with the unique opportunity of a centenary 
celebration in an epoch of change and questioning, amidst 
prospects for world peace, can afford the luxury of contem-
plating fundamental rather than marginal alterations to its 
system of government, especially as the change agents, the 
community leaders in 2001, will have little legacy of inse-
curity, not having direct experience of world wars and de-
pressions. Lessons can be learnt from universal experience. 
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Advocated reforms 
My own position on this is clear. Given the opportunity, 
Australia, for the twenty-first century, could do well to 
adopt the following: 
• from the United States — proactive democracy, human 
rights protection, and republicanism; 
• retention of British codes and respect for the law, the Par-
liamentary process, and the system of justice; 
• German methods of the federal division of power, con-
summate rationality in vertical financial balance and 
administrative relations between federal/state/local gov-
ernments; 
• Canadian-style pursuit of Aboriginal rights and freedoms, 
the model of the Supreme Court, their cautious approach 
to privatisation, and their health care system; 
• French models of mixed enterprise between public and 
private sector, indicative planning and the espirit de 
corps between public- and private-sector managers; 
• from India the concept of one public service for both fed-
eral and state governments, and the notion of merging 
planning with federalism; 
• the Scottish education system; 
• the Italian highway system; and 
• the Swiss style of referendum, including citizens' initia-
tives. 
Abolish the states? 
To tease out just a few items from this wish list: should the 
Australian states be abolished and would we be better 
served with a unitary form of government? It is a well can-
vassed argument in the literature. Comparisons produce lit-
tle in the way of concrete results. The world has long 
consisted of variations of unitary, confederal and federal 
forms of government, especially if we accept Rufus Davis's 
contention that the principal ingredient in the concept of 
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federalism is the term "covenant", and covenant has been at 
the heart of many regimes in ancient and modem history. 
We could reassess federalism in the light of Geoffrey 
Sawer's deUghtful synopsis: 
If, however, an attempt is made to evaluate federalism in the 
range of constitutional systems, 1 would say that it is a pruden-
tial system best suited to the relatively stable, satisfied societies 
of squares such as abound in Canada, Australia, West Germany 
and Austria, and probably still constitute the majority in the 
USA. It is not a swinging system. People are not likely to go to 
the stake, or the barricades, to defend federalism as such. They 
may undertake heroic actions for the sake of some value which 
federalism happens at the minute to favour, and may then even 
inscribe federalism on their banner — Liberty and Federalism' 
— 'Equality and Federalism' — but never just 'Federalism'. My 
own preference would be for a Bill of Rights state, but I would 
sooner live in a moderately incompetent affluent federalism 
than in any centralised system with no entrenched Bill of Rights 
at all,"" 
There have not been many political systems which have 
changed from one form to the other, although far more have 
changed from unitary to federal than from federal to uni-
tary . Belgium was the latest to join the ranks of federal coun-
tries last year and the federal solution has been proposed for 
trouble spots or places where minorities, including racial 
minorities, have no hope of having their voices heard in the 
majoritarian rule of unitary government institutions. Thus 
Cyprus, Jerusalem, Fiji and Spain have been seriously con-
sidered as candidates for federalism, not to mention the new 
EEC itself. Any federations which became unitary systems, 
and there are very few, did so mainly as a result of irrevers-
ible internal breakdown and violent secession and fragmen-
tation. The fact that their constitutions had often been 
designed by colonial govenments which failed to leave be-
hind suitable models of government is part of the tale. Fed-
eralism for colonies was principally favoured by the British 
in this respect. Two points of view on this have been pro-
ffered: one that the British believed the diversity within 
some of their colonies, especially in Africa and Asia, would 
not permit a unitary regime and federalism would promote 
stabihty; and the less altruistic perspective — that it was part 
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of a divide-and-conquer policy for colonies which could 
continue to supply raw material for the mother country's 
manufacturers and consumers, and markets for its finished 
goods. 
Whatever the interpretation, federations around the 
world are to be found in two main circumstances: in large 
geographical countries, or where cultural diversity prohib-
its unity and unitary forms. 
Authors writing in the middle of this century, and even 
post-Kenneth Wheare's classical studies,^ argued that feder-
alism was an unstable form of government, an embryonic 
arrangement which a nation would surely pass through on 
the road to becoming unitary or self-destructing. Time has 
proven them wrong. Political scientists have provided 
much of the explanation because the analyses of constitu-
tional lawyers initially gave little clue as to the internal dy-
namics of power relationships which could take place 
within federal systems. Sociologists like Livingston^ went 
further and demonstrated how the social forces at large 
could be shaped by, and shape, the evolution of the federal 
framework. The net result is that most theorists agree that 
federalism can be dynamic, evolutionary and responsive to 
political forces. A federal system is, after all, like any other 
political system — an array of checks and balances, to use 
Dahl 's '^ words, an authoritative allocation of values, a field 
where interest groups can play. It just happens that the 
forces are usually arranged spatially rather than function-
ally. As S imeon" observes regarding Canada, today people 
often believe that the federal opposition is not the party in 
Ottawa on the left of the speaker, but rather that the federal 
opposition is the ten premiers. 
Advocates of a unitary system for Australia have rarely 
followed their advocacy with a realistic alternative design. 
In particular, they and the bulk of the literature on inter-
governmental relations seem to overlook the distinguishing 
feature of federalism — divided sovereignty, a mystical con-
cept but one from which all other relationships derive. Pure 
regionalism does not divide sovereignty. The best known, 
that of the AustraUan Labor Party, postulated a national gov-
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emment and thirty-six regions, and those regions made 
some sense as they amalgamated state and local govern-
ments. But the powers to be given to the regions were virtu-
ally identical to those currently possessed by the states. A 
Premiers' Conference with thirty-seven present is a daunt-
ing spectacle. AboUshing the states and local governments 
to achieve regionalism is a messy legal operation and in-
volves so much lateral thinking that it is almost certainly to 
be feared to the point of obstinacy by most Australians. The 
same principle might more easily be achieved by creation of 
new states for which the Australian Constitution already 
makes clear provision. Throughout the twentieth century 
the population growth will make the new states movement 
more tenable than ever before. The Northern Territory is 
clearly the first candidate, and the easiest, though it, like 
many new states, may not meet the test of economic viabil-
ity for some time. The other test is community of interest 
and that clearly appUes here. The old agitators — north 
Queensland and New England — may well be interested 
again in new statehood, and indeed the eastern seaboard 
may well be the focal point as south-east Queensland and 
northern New South Wales progress as a nodal point; cen-
tral Queenslanders have long shunned north Queensland 
and southern Queensland in any community-of-interest cri-
terion. 
At any event, in the light of size of the country relative to 
population, in the absence of demonstrated advantages and 
bearing in mind legal complexities, the arguments favour re-
tention of a federal system, especially as other federations 
have been able to adapt and change relations between na-
tional and state governments. I do not enter the local gov-
ernment debate in any depth except to say that it is an 
antiquated structure, many individual local authorities in 
Australia give substantial cause for concern over rapid pop-
ulation decline and escalation in indebtedness, boundaries 
do not reflect true community of interest, and absurd over-
spills are in evidence, especially surrounding provincial cit-
ies. The main community of interest to be found in 
Australia's 860 local government units is poverty. One of 
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the greatest tragedies of political boundaries in Australia — 
between parties, between local authorities and between 
public policies built on those foundations — is that they di-
vide urban from rural people, attempting to emphasise dif-
ferences rather than the true inter-dependence which exists 
between them and which, if captured, could be a more dy-
namic force socially and economically. 
Having argued for a retention of state and local govern-
ments, albeit with some serious rearrangement of them, the 
basic question arises as to what the relationship between 
them should be and how it should be processed. 
It must be said at the outset that the fundamental problem 
in the existing Australian federal system is the imbalance of 
power between the federal and state governments. The na-
tional government is supreme in most arenas, largely be-
cause of the operation of our institutional framework. The 
states have very little formal influence over those bodies 
which allocate powers, resources and values in Australia. 
The states cannot make appointments to the High Court, In-
dustry Commission, Reserve Bank, Broadcasting Tribunal, 
ABC, Industrial Commission, Censorship Board or Australia 
Council. Yet a dynamic balance of power can only be 
achieved in a federation if each level of government has av-
enues to contribute to the policy-making which affects its 
operation. 
The principal failure in this respect is the Senate, meant to 
be the main hope, designed as a states house but now oper-
ating well short of these expectations. The main distortion 
comes, of course, through the operation of the party system 
with its rigid discipline. There are subterranean forces at 
work which make the Senate a little more of a states house 
than is popularly believed, as drawn to our attention by 
Sharman, Uhr, Odgers and others.'^ The state preselection 
of senators, the power of state governors to issue Senate 
election writs, the caucusing in party rooms by state and the 
occasional state alignment on specific Bills with a regional 
focus all testify to the greater state focus in the Senate than 
the House of Representatives. This is true especially as re-
gards smaller states, who of course have usually been more 
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suspicious of the larger states than of the federal govern-
ment; the same is true of most federations. It is all something 
of a curious paradox. 
William Riker tells us it is possible to know everything 
about federal systems if one understands the party system 
and how it functions.'^ Yet Australian political parties are 
really confederations themselves. The Australian Demo-
crats are at one end of the spectrum, as the most unified; the 
Australian Labor Party will occasionally and desperately 
have its national body invade a state branch or replace the 
odd state premier or two; but the Liberal and National Par-
ties are so confederal as to have a barely visible central core. 
Yet, in the Senate, all parties behave (on the floor at least) as 
apologists for a unified centralist party perspective. Clearly 
there is an urgent need in Australia for further research to 
supplement the paucity which exists on the internal dynam-
ics of political party branch relationships and how it spills 
into party policy and action. 
It is doubtful, therefore, whether the Senate would vol-
untarily reform itself into a true states house. Constitutional 
change may be required to force it to accept the leading brief 
for oversight of federal — state relations along the lines of 
the German Bundesrat, but not appointed by states, simply 
given a mandate to oversight and approve legislation affect-
ing states, fiscal and other aspects of inter-governmental re-
lations. It would be desirable to break the nexus to prevent 
it from growing. If the United States can manage with 100 
senators and Canada with 116, surely Australia can survive 
with its present seventy-six for a long while into the twenty-
first century. 
In response to the lack of influence of the Senate, other 
avenues have sprung up in Australia for power plays be-
tween state and national governments, chief among them 
the industry of executive federaUsm from the Premiers' 
Conference and Loan Council at the top of the pile down 
through Ministerial Councils, meetings of administrators 
and so on. Today New Zealand is also often included, lead-
ing to some strong expectations across the Tasman that New 
Zealand will ultimately be drawn into political union with 
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Australia, as insulting to New Zealand's sovereignty as it is 
to Australia's. We once gratuitously offered them the 
chance to become aligned; they sensibly refused. 
Executive federalism: Premiers' 
Conferences 
Time and space simply do not permit a revisitation of the 
now-immense body of literature on executive federalism.'^ 
A few salient points will suffice. The supreme political body 
in federal-state relations, the Premiers' Conference, is not 
even mentioned in the Australian Constitution, nor any of 
the other ministerial prototypes. They should be, as they are 
in Canada and West Germany. The essential problem is that, 
whilst they "get things done" and "make federalism 
work ", it is at the too-high price of lack of political account-
ability and responsibility. Moreover, if there is one crying 
need for reform, it is the injection of more rationality into 
an abject political process. The Premiers' Conference and 
the rectification of vertical fiscal imbalance is the prime ex-
ample. One-half of the nation's public sector resources are 
carved up at what can only be described as a poker game, 
the Premiers' Conference. The answer lies in tax sharing, 
the introduction of a constitutional formula for that tax 
sharing, an expert and impartial body at the junction of the 
governments to appraise and advise on the relative tax-shar-
ing properties, and the completion of longer term frame-
works for agreements between the federal and state 
governments or expenditure programs in health, welfare, 
roads and so on. 
Nobody in Australia, except Mr Keating, believes 
Premiers' Conferences are an effective mechanism. Some 
are trenchant in their criticism — Sir Robert Menzies called 
the Premiers a bunch of "pinchbeck Caesars" and the ir-
reverant, irrepressible Edward Gough Whitlam summed up 
Premiers when he said, "Some people would rather be on 
top of a two-foot dung hill than two foot up a six-foot dung 
hill." Clearly the Premiers' Conference process will be re-
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formed by the leading philosphies in Australia in the 1990s, 
already shaping up to be rationality and pragmatism. 
Nowhere is rationaUty needed more than in Loan Council 
deliberations. The Loan Council is at least mentioned in the 
Australian Constitution, Section 105, 105A, but it is a story 
of lost opportunity in this country. Now in a growing nation 
like Australia, with so much room to move, capital infra-
structure expenditure is the lifeblood of the nation, the ac-
celerator, the multiplier, the sheer sign pointing the way to 
future planning by function and by location, but only if that 
capital expenditure is distributed by economic or social 
needs criteria, preferably on some kind of benefit/cost or so-
cial impact basis. Instead, Loan Council deliberations, again 
in secret, simply parcel out bundles to each state on political 
criteria and allow them to be pork-barrelled and otherwise 
squandered. Moreover, the capital expenditure is distrib-
uted separately, and using different criteria, from the recur-
rent expenditure. Is it any wonder that we have teachers 
hired but schools not ready, hospitals constructed but insuf-
ficient funding for medical staff and so on? It may be that the 
Hawke government's deregulation push and the fragmenta-
tion of the Loan Council's powers have neutralised its im-
pact for ever. Australia will soon have "government by 
Moody's ", which brings with it the danger that market-ori-
ented appraisals frown severely on social expenditure. No 
state government ever maintained a Triple A rating by sus-
taining high expenditure on social functions. 
Of course, not all authors are pessimistic about these 
matters. Those of us who favour greater rationality in Aus-
tralian federal-state relations are often accused by authors 
such as Galligan, Sharman, Sproule-Jones and Walsh as hav-
ing minds that are too neat and tidy. A little pluralist pork-
barrelUng never hurt anybody, and overlapping and 
dupUcation are a sign of healthy market forces at work — 
public choice at its best, they say. Perhaps this is one of the 
few points at which some public administrationists depart 
from their symbiotic partners, political scientists. After all, 
public administration has always been about means as well 
as ends, the relationship of policy to management, the di-
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chotomy of rationalism versus incrementalism and mud-
dling through, and the clear message from the literature of 
public policy over the past fifteen years is that the policy 
process can often drive the outcome. It is when pluralism 
confronts realities of resource allocation in finite environ-
ments that public administration, with its own focus and 
predatory approach across disciplines, can offer compro-
mise solutions. In any event, if the test is a federal system 
which is efficient and effective, reform of current arrange-
ments is essential. 
There will be no genuinely democratic system of federal 
state relations in Australia until vertial financial balance is 
restored. The only long-term solution to a more rational, ef-
fective and accountable system of federalism in Australia is 
for state and local governments to undertake more of their 
own taxation. It is now widely accepted that vertical finan-
cial imbalance lies at the heart of the many problems being 
experienced in overlapping, duplication, lack of role differ-
entiation, etc. 
State taxes 
The issue of state government resumption of taxation pow-
ers has been raised from the moment of introduction of uni-
form taxation in 1942. It was advocated by the states most 
forcibly exactly twenty years ago, when they confronted 
John Gorton at the Premiers' Conference in 1970, but they 
crumbled when offered $ 1 billion in loan redemption in-
stead.'5 On that occasion, the main argument advanced by 
the Commonwealth was exactly the same as the one that 
will be advanced at the Premiers' Conference tomorrow: 
the Commonwealth must occupy the maximum tax room to 
handle macro-economic management. However, on this oc-
casion the Prime Minister has himself raised the question of 
how much tax room the Commonwealth needs to occupy 
for this purpose. 
The current climate has produced the opportunity to re-
open this question, and more importantly, to keep it open. 
What do the literature and comparative experience have to 
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say on this matter? ^^ In no other federal system in the 
world does the national government occupy such a large 
part of the taxation field, yet all of them possess the other 
weapons for economic management which the Australian 
Commonwealth government has. In the vast majority of 
federal systems, there is a sharing of the taxation fields be-
tween the three levels of government, including the major 
direct and indirect taxes (with the exception of customs du-
ties which, by their nature, tend to be a national tax). In 
those federal systems where the division of expenditure 
functions between levels of government is similar to that in 
Australia, the national government occupies between ap-
proximately 40 per cent and 70 per cent of the income tax 
field and between approximately half and three-quarters of 
the major indirect taxes. There is no evidence that failure to 
occupy the bulk of the taxation field has hampered macro-
economic management on the part of national governments 
in those federations. Of course, many federations have far 
more sophisticated processes for the achievement of 
harmonisation and co-ordination of taxation policy be-
tween levels of government that we have in this country. 
The Commonwealth government, like all national gov-
ernments in federal systems, but perhaps even more than 
most, has a range of policy instruments at its disposal to 
manage the economy. Apart from taxation policy, these in-
clude domestic monetary policy, trade and tariff policy, ex-
ternal monetary and exchange rate policy, wages policy, 
competition policy, loan and borrowing/capital expendi-
ture policy and, to some extent, prices policies. The Austra-
lian Commonwealth government still enjoys tighter control 
over government borrowing (for all levels of government) 
than does any other national government, but its powers 
over prices and incomes are somewhat more circumscribed 
in theory (thought not in reality). There is also arguably a 
greater proportion of key infrastructure and service provi-
sion in Australia carried out through the public sector, espe-
cially through government business enterprises and utilities, 
than is true in most other federal systems, with a substantial 
share of this ownership in Commonwealth hands. The 
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whole point of this argument is that the Commonwealth 
government has many means of macro-economic manage-
ment other than taxation policy. 
All of the literature and comparative experience reveal 
the stark truth that there is simply no clear answer to the 
question as to how much taxation room needs to be occu-
pied by a national government in a federation to manage the 
economy. There also seems to be significant doubt as to 
whether such a precise figure can ever be calculated. How-
ever, very little research has been conducted on this subject. 
The legal opinions are clear that a return of state govern-
ments to income taxation can be achieved simply and 
within the constitution. There are no legal complications 
other than that the residual Commonwealth income tax will 
have to be uniform as between states (Section 99 and Sec-
tion 51[ii]) The cleanest method would be for the Com-
monwealth to reduce its share of income tax and reduce the 
unconditional payments to the states commensurately. This 
is, after all, simply the reverse of the process which oc-
curred when uniform taxation was introduced. If equalisa-
tion is still desired, there would seem to be a need to 
equalise resultant state income taxation regimes, presum-
ably after each state had decided on its tax level. There is 
unanimous agreement as to the desirability of keeping in-
come tax bases and "structures" uniform to avoid confu-
sion and complexity, together with a single method of tax 
collection as at present. 
Personal income tax sharing is simpler than corporate tax 
sharing, although states and provinces in many other federal 
systems manage to levy corporate income taxes without too 
much trouble. The main difficulty which arises is the head-
quarters syndrome and potential for taxation at source of 
the derived income. Legal opinion regarding indirect taxes 
is another matter. It seems clear that some of the more 
minor taxes, especially consumption taxes, could be shared, 
although AustraUans still pay far too little consumption tax 
as compared with direct taxes. The vagaries of High Court 
opinions suggest that constitutional change would be neces-
sary for any sharing of wholesale taxes. Maybe the inter-
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change of powers clause could be invoked but, it is doubtful 
if that would withstand challenge. Most analysts believe 
that, with a reduced share of income tax, the Common-
wealth could still steer the economy with only slightly 
larger changes to taxation rates. These arguments are some-
what complex, but they revolve around the relationship of 
taxation levels to GDP, tax multipliers and elasticity of taxa-
tion regimes. 
Other federal systems reveal a variety of options for ad-
ministration of the tax split. The most popular is tax sharing 
with outright shares of taxes earmarked for particular levels 
of government. The West German model is the most ratio-
nal, with two-year adjustments to tax shares in the light of 
objective appraisal of the needs of the three levels of gov-
ernment. Another variation is the "piggy-back model", as 
used in Canada for some time, and the clear third option is 
simple divorce of taxation regimes between the three levels. 
The theories on this matter, especially public finance and 
public choice, most of which began from the Musgrave*^ 
position on allocation, distribution and stabilisation func-
tions of public finance, offer divergent opinions, but all are 
reasonably well agreed that a trade-off is required between 
allocations of taxation that favour most efficient tax inci-
dence and application, and those that encourage fiscal re-
sponsibility in the sense of not divorcing taxation from 
expenditure decisions. These two principles appear to be 
fundamentally incompatible, so a trade-off is definitely re-
quired. A long-term commitment to this fundamental re-
form is essential. One has the distinct impression from all of 
the theories of public finance and public choice that they 
have been designed to fit unitary systems of government 
(where of course the national government is supreme) and 
then adapted to attempt to fit federal systems. No wonder a 
trade-off is involved. These problems confront the 
Premiers' Conference tomorrow. The participants in that 
conference have an historic opportunity to introduce sensi-
ble tax sharing. There is no reason why income tax sharing 
could not be agreed upon by them immediately and intro-
duced from 1992/1993. 
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Of course there is more to life than revenue. There is also 
expenditure, and a shakeout is required of fed-
eral/state/local responsibihties to come into line with 
twenty-first century reality, to avoid overlapping, duplica-
tion and confusion to the voter, the citizen, the client, as to 
which level of government is responsible. Ken Knight's ob-
servation about the impact of overlapping and duplication is 
still highly pertinent today: "No doubt society is enriched 
by diversity of activity and ideas, and it may be that the fed-
eral system can be defended on various grounds. But admin-
istrative efficiency is not one of them "'^ To the traditional 
concerns over this matter regarding accountability, poten-
tial for buck-passing and potential for either over-govern-
ment or zones of anarchy and neglect in meeting real client 
needs have now been added the concerns of industry that a 
confused federal system will hinder micro-economic re-
form, deregulation of industry and hence Australia's export 
competitiveness. Lack of policy co-ordination and 
harmonisation, together with overlapping and duplication, 
will hinder reform of government business enterprises, util-
ities and regulatory arrangements. 
Now popular opinion would have us believe that it 
should be possible to roll back the overlap and return to 
layer-cake, co-ordinate federalism Wheare-style, with dis-
crete government functions parcelled up into watertight 
levels of government. But experience around the world says 
that this is not so. Geoffrey Sawer's organic federalism is 
here to stay. The Rowell-Sirois report in Canada in the 
1940s,'9 the Kestnbaum report in the United States^o in the 
1950s and the ACIR report in Australia in the 19708^' reveal 
that government functions are so intertwined that the only 
way forward is to speak in terms of the role of each level of 
government within the shared function. The West German 
federation, created late in world history in 1949, has a divi-
sion of powers based on this very principle. The Canadian 
system, while not able to rejig its formal powers this way be-
cause of Sections 91 and 92 of the constitution, at least each 
year publishes a comprehensive inventory of federal-pro-
vincial programs, explaining clearly the role of each level of 
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government in shared programs. Based on this international 
comparative experience, we can expect that the national 
goverrunent will have a role whenever issues such as unifor-
mity, universality, accessibility, accountability, portability, 
externality, standards, mobility, etc. are concerned, and 
state and local governments must be involved with policy 
input, design, delivery, implementation and evaluation. 
For AustraUa, the West German system of horizontal role 
allocation would be preferable if the Senate were able to be 
beefed up commensurately to oversee the role separation. 
Failing that, a Canadian-style role clarification is essential 
and we need a new Senate Standing Committee on Inter-
governmental Relations to oversight and provide demo-
cratic input into the myriad facets of inter-governmental 
responsibihty sharing. It seems nothing short of remarkable 
that the Senate, supposedly a states house, has no ongoing 
institutional commitment to federal-state relations, and this 
needs to be rectified immediately. 
The Grants Commission will need to be retained, despite 
vigorous academic argument against horizontal equalisation 
in Canada and AustraUa to satisfy locational disadvantage of 
a macro kind. If West Germany can accommodate the 
"Pfennigless five " East German states into its new structure, 
it should not be beyond Australia to continue its equalisa-
tion arrangements. The states also complain about condi-
tional funding from the Commonweahh. The proportion of 
conditional funding in federal transfers has oscillated in the 
post-war period between 25 per cent and the current 50 per 
cent of the total, but these figures are distorting because 
only a fraction of conditionaUy funded programs actually 
distort state priorities — no more than 15 per cent of them, 
in fact — and any distortion that does exist has more to do 
with inadequate state government policy co-ordination ma-
chinery, especially breakdowns in relations between state 
central agencies and line departments.^^ 
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Equity 
These reforms would go some way towards a system of gov-
ernment that was efficient and more effective. The issue of 
a reformed AustraUan system of government that promotes 
equity remains. Of course, the word "equity " is the most 
precious word in the Australian poUtical lexicon. From the 
European convict heritage, together with the pattern of set-
tlement and the sheer opportunities afforded a pioneer 
frontier society, concepts of egalitarianism have long run 
through our institutions of government. Equity is seen by 
Australians as a positive virtue and rightly so. Nonetheless, 
it has been given some peculiar twists in our society. In the 
name of equality we tear down tall poppies, handicap gifted 
children, squeeze productivity and enterprise out of our in-
dustrial relations, allow number crunchers to herd people 
into normal curves as if they were animals and design ad-
ministrative nightmares to police means test which frighten 
and discourage our aged population from working or accu-
mulating assets. Equality AustraUan style was never meant 
to be an imposition on the productive and thrifty; it was 
meant to mean equality of opportunity. Even an arch con-
servative such as Robert Menzies built into the design of his 
new party in the late 1940s a rationale for government inter-
vention if it meant the promotion of equality of opportu-
nity, especiaUy through education. 
Bill of Rights 
There are two outstanding areas for reform in Australian 
government to meet the equity objective — a Bill of Rights 
and the issue of Aboriginal rights and freedoms, or even 
some meshing of the two. The arguments traditionally 
raised against a Bill of Rights for Australia revolve around 
two basic themes: that our British system of government 
and law, with its long historical evolution of protection of 
civil liberties through ParUament, would be threatened by a 
constitutionaUy entrenched BiU of Rights, because redress 
of rights abuse would henceforth take place through the 
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courts rather than through Parliamentary channels; and that 
a constitutionaUy entrenched BiU of Rights in a federal sys-
tem would impinge upon the sovereignty of state and local 
governments. Some are even audacious enough to say that 
rights are already protected by the Australian Constitution 
and simple legislation which could be passed by each unit of 
government. Well, the British system of law has hardly 
proved effective in protecting even British citizens against 
oppressive laws, and Britain is itself becoming rapidly en-
meshed in European Codes of Civil Rights Protection. Par-
liament could by no stretch of the imagination be 
considered an effective means for the redress of individual 
or even group grievances. The Australian Constitution has 
only four scattered guarantees, narrowly drafted and inter-
preted (Sections 51[3], 80, 116, and 117), and any idea of 
getting a Commonwealth government, six state govern-
ments, one and a half Territory governments and 860 local 
governments to introduce legislation is pie in the sky. As 
John Adams said of the United States, getting all the states to 
agree on uniform legislation would have been like getting 
thirteen clocks all to strike at the same moment. 
The founding fathers did consider a BiU of Rights along 
the lines of the United States model but, in the words of Mc-
MiUan, Evans and Storey: 
were confident that the people's democratically elected repre-
sentatives would respect an Anglo-Saxon tradition of self-re-
straint, guided by inherited principles like the rule of law. To 
define the rights of the citizen might in fact constitute an insult-
ing and adverse reflection on Australian civilisation. For some 
delegates there was also a pragmatic reason: to preserve exist-
ing factory and mining legislation that discriminated against 
Chinese and other colonial aliens.^ "^ 
International experience among federal systems reveals a 
spectrum of institutional arrangements. At one end of the 
spectrum is the United States, with its constitutionaUy en-
trenched BiU, ten amendments passed early in American his-
tory. In the middle of the spectrum comes Canada with a 
constitutionally entrenched Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, but with some aspects on which the provinces can 
opt out using notwithstanding provisions. And at the far end 
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of the spectrum comes AustraUa, with no constitutional en-
trenchment — just a feeble piece of Commonwealth legisla-
tion and various human rights officials who traipse around 
the nation copping abuse from aU and sundry. Many other 
federations are at some point along the spectrum, but the 
trend is toward entrenchment as government becomes 
more pervasive. 
Australia needs a BiU of Rights, an American version. The 
reactionary past behaviour of many state goverments de-
mands it, the insensitivity of successive Commonwealth 
governments over privacy demands it, the frustrations of a 
multicultural society with obscure Anglo-Saxon concepts 
demand it, the necessity for the spirit of a nation bent on 
achievement and pursuit of happiness in the twentieth cen-
tury demands it. 
Critics of a BUI of Rights overlook two of its most import-
ant contributions, probably because both of them are diffi-
cult to define and measure. A BUI of Rights has substantial 
deterrent value. It also transforms the Supreme Court. Aus-
tralia needs a deterrent to abuse of civil liberties; no amount 
of exhortation is adequate. In any event, Australia is already 
party to the major international human rights instruments 
of the United Nations, ILO and UNESCO. And our High 
Court is in dire need of a culture shock. Experience in Amer-
ica and Canada reveals that the introduction of a Bill of 
Rights into a constitution forces the nation's supreme judi-
cial institutions to cast aside blind reliance on precedents, 
fundamentalist interpretation of clauses, phrases, words 
and punctuation marks, and to be more accessible, more so-
cial, even more political. Now it is somewhat ironic that po-
litical scientists often advocate taking functions from 
political institutions and giving them to legal ones, whereas 
lawyers often argue the opposite. Each discipline seems to 
be so concerned about the defects of the institutions and 
processes that are its primary focus that it wants a shift. The 
Australian High Court needs to be more accessible, less ex-
pensive, easier on eligibility for standing, able to give advi-
sory opinions and more consistent in its approach to 
interpretation. As Lionel Murphy once remarked, it seems 
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appropriate that Australian courts have been so reliant in the 
past on precedent in a nation populated mainly by sheep. A 
BiU of Rights would fix them; they would become more Uke 
sociologists and, as Galligan has so effectively demon-
strated, they are politicians already anyway.^"^ 
Aborigines 
No consideration of equity issues would be complete with-
out attention to the quest for Aboriginal rights and free-
doms. Let there be no doubt, AustraUa's record in this 
domain is a national disgrace and significantly jeopardises 
our standing in the world community. The history is well 
known. Unlike the situation for other British colonies 
strung across the Pacific, there was no treaty in Australia, 
only the bland legal edict of Terra Nullis. Left to the jurisdic-
tion of state governments, denied even being counted in the 
census, the Aboriginal people became victims of white dis-
ease, alienation from spiritual association with the land, 
good but misdirected intentions of missionaries and a white 
backlash bom of ignorance, fear and racism. In 1967, some 
twenty-three years ago, the people of Australia passed a ref-
erendum with the largest "yes" vote ever seen in referen-
dums to give the federal government jurisdiction over 
Aboriginal matters. Those of us who voted in that referen-
dum recaU clearly that this was the intent. Yet from that day 
to this, successive federal governments have claimed that 
the referendum conferred only concurrent powers on the 
national government and have been singularly unwilUng to 
intervene against the states which, for most of this century, 
have followed repressive policies. The Aboriginal people, 
for their part, have pursued a single-minded focus on land 
rights to the neglect of other remedies for their situation. 
The situation regarding Aboriginal affairs demands im-
mediate attention, and the debate must begin now. If one ac-
cepts the case for rights for indigenous peoples, and I do, 
there is now a variety of options available for Australia to 
study. Canada and the United States reveal valuable experi-
ence. Canada is particularly pertinent, owing to the similar-
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ities with Australia. Admittedly, some Canadian Indians 
have pre-confederation or post-confederation treaties, but 
many do not. In Canada there are at least fifteen separate ini-
tiatives occurring towards rights and self-government for 
Indian, Inuit and Metis. To use white parlance, they include 
top-down and bottom-up initiatives, including constitu-
tional entrenchment of native rights, premiers' conferen-
ces, appeals to international law, federal legislation, 
economic development agreements, comprehensive claims, 
local government models, tripartite arrangements with 
provinces and local government and so on. On our door-
step. New Zealanders have rediscovered the Treaty of 
Waitangi, and a Waitangi Tribunal has been very effectively 
exposing inconsistencies between Maori and Pakeha per-
spectives on the treaty. The New Zealand government has 
ordered a fundamental review of all its legislation to ascer-
tain whether it is compatible with the treaty. 
Throughout the world, the rights of indigenous peoples 
are being rediscovered and recognised. Experience shows 
that, regrettably, a generation or two of paternalism is re-
quired. In those countries where the most fullsome pursuit 
of Aboriginal rights is occurring, governments had simply 
accepted that native peoples would require one or two gen-
erations of health care, housing and, most importantly, edu-
cation, before they would be ready to engage in the pursuit 
of their own objectives. Education was targeted — educa-
tion in law, economics and education itself. The Australian 
solution, by and large, has been to throw money rather than 
targeted funding at those facets which would lead Aborigi-
nes to intellectual and physical self-sufficiency. Even one 
white political philosopher, John Stuart Mill, was prepared 
to exempt education from his laissez-faire constructs and 
accept paternalism and elitism as inevitable in this funda-
mental ingredient for citizenship. 
I am attracted to the notion of constitutional entrench-
ment of native rights for the same reasons which point to a 
BiU of Rights, together with other models, especially eco-
nomic development. However, it would be presumptuous 
of the white population to foreshadow favoured options 
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until equal discussions can ensue. If the issue can be ad-
dressed and productive discussions occur for the next de-
cade. Aboriginal people can easUy join in the celebrations of 
Australian independence and federation in 2001 in a way 
that they never could have participated in the insensitive, ri-
diculous farce of 1988. 
It is very important to realise that the resolution of this 
matter is, in many ways, simply a repeat of the process 
which white society has had to go through over the past 800 
years in the case of Anglo-Saxon society from Magna Carta 
through Tudors, Stuarts, Reform BUls, Habeas Corpus, BiUs 
of Rights, etc., not to mention the profound intellectual 
input of Paine, Hume, Locke, Rousseau, MUl, Smith, etc. 
Much of that political phUosophy is highly relevant to the le-
gitimate quest by native groups for rights and self-govern-
ment. If it took white society so long to evolve its own 
concepts and position regarding human rights, including 
the lessons from the French, American and Russian Revolu-
tions, we surely cannot deny Aboriginal people the time for 
fuUsome debate. For it is time that is the essence of this mat-
ter. So often the epitome of the white/Aboriginal conflict in 
Australia and elsewhere is that white society approaches all 
of the discussions from the perspective of contractual termi-
nation, once and for all settlement and reUnquishment; but 
for Aboriginal people throughout the world, the essence of 
bargaining is to establish ongoing dynamic processes for 
continual negotiation, not finality. With two such different 
cultural perceptions, is it any wonder dialogue breaks down 
so often? Moreover, white society overlooks the fact that 
Aboriginal culture has its own equivalent poUtical and reli-
gious philosophies with a heritage of at least 40 000 years, if 
not as long as 100 000 years, it would be surprising if this 
were not so. The '"invisible hand" is known to both Aborig-
inal and white cultures, only the language and symbols are 
different. 
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Responsible government 
The other major area of defect in Australia's system of gov-
ernment is clearly the breakdown of Westminster notions of 
responsible government. This is everywhere in evidence. 
The important combination of Westminster with federalism 
has already been mentioned, especially the inadequacy of 
Section 57 of the constitution. We clearly need a mecha-
nism whereby any attempt by the Senate to block supply 
should cause the dissolution of Senate itself, and we must re-
gard inordinate delay to the passage of supply as a blockage. 
The amendment to this effect proposed by Sir Charles Court 
at the Constitutional Convention is an admirable solution. 
Admittedly, designing Upper Houses is difficult. They tend 
to be either appointed and weak or elected and strong, and 
it is impossible for them to please; if they do nothing every-
body says abolish them, and if they do exert their powers 
everybody says abolish them. Nonetheless it is patently un-
democratic for an Upper House to have the power to bring 
the dissolution of the Lower House without itself having to 
go to the poUs. 
However, the fundamental weakness in our system is the 
decline of ministerial accountabiUty — the lynchpin in the 
logic of the Westminster system of accountable govern-
ment. The peculiar fusion of legislature and executive 
through the device of the Cabinet places added tensions on 
the separation of powers in attempting to make ministers 
accountable to Parliament. Contrary to nonsensical specula-
tion throughout Australia in 1989, as a consequence of an-
tics by Queensland ministers, there is a separation of 
powers in Australia. Ministers are separately members of 
Parliament and members of the executive. To coin an ap-
palling mixed metaphor, the members of the buckle which 
fastens wear two hats. It must be conceded that it is more 
difficult to maintain a separation of powers in a pure West-
minster system, especially given the advent of rigid party 
discipline which aUows governments to dominate ParUa-
ment. This aspect and others have been responsible for the 
fact that there have been over forty instances at the national 
level since the VIP planes affair in 1966 when ministerial re-
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sponsibility has broken down. Ministers have refused to re-
sign and have not been forced to resign. Add to that the 
number of state government instances and the system has 
become decidedly wobbly. 
In response to this lack of effectiveness of the legislative 
arm, we, in Australia, have turned to the other arm of 
Montesquieu's separation of powers doctrine to achieve 
checks on the executive — the legal system and legal/quasi-
legal solutions. Tenterfield revisited wUl have to mean Mon-
tesquieu revisited. Codes of conduct, FOI legislation. 
Administrative Appeals Tribunals, whistieblowers, con-
tracts, financial administration and audit Acts, plus the part-
Parliamentary bodies, the ombudsman and his Uk, have all 
shored up the weaknesses of Parliament as watchdog. We 
live in the age of the paras, para-judicial and para-Parliamen-
tary bodies, and Australia has the most complex new admin-
istrative law regime in the Westminster world. Queensland, 
with all its post-Fitzgerald apparatus, has the most complex 
machinery of government in Australia, probably too 
weighty for a medium-scale poUtical system. Apart from the 
potential for such machinery to come unstuck in terms of 
the relationship between its constituent parts, the net result 
of it aU is to take the political pressure of accountability 
away from ministers. Once legal or quasi-legal channels 
exist, and Parliament acquiesces irt their dominance as ave-
nues for redress, the doctrine of ministerial responsibility is 
aU but dead. Thus has come the transition to presidential-
style politics in Australia from Westminster, with large per-
vasive Prime Minister's and Premier's Departments, often 
mini-bureaucracies if Weller's account of Eraser's years is 
any guide.^^ This is aided and abetted by an over-
personalisation of Australian politics by our media, which 
focuses so much on the Chief Executive that he or she must 
perforce become more than iust primus inter pares and be 
totally knowledgeable and articulate about every nook and 
cranny of the public sector and much of the private sector to 
boot. 
There are two basic choices for directions for reform in 
this matter: either to go with the flow, accept the trend and 
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look increasingly elsewhere than Parliament for checks on 
government; or attempt to reform ParUament to its Victor-
ian pristine condition, sharpen its powers, put some fibre in 
its diet. 
1 prefer the latter course, and the first step is to give Par-
liament control over its own resources, for it can hardly 
watch over the executive's resources if the executive con-
trols Parliament's own staffing, finance and physical do-
main. The Canadian federal parliament, and especiaUy the 
Ontario legislature, are models in this regard and so now is 
the British Parliament. Other reforms can follow, including, 
in particular, greater research capacity, more time for com-
mittee work and new committees, extended question time 
and so on. The list is well known to poUtical scientists. It is 
also essential that ParUament be televised, because if Parlia-
ment is to be restored to its central position in our demo-
cratic system, as for example envisaged in all of Fitzgerald's 
reforms, it must have a central position in the visual and sen-
sual perceptions of the Australian people and that means in 
that little magic box in AustraUan households where the 
elections of today are won or lost. If the spotlight will not 
move to Parliament, Parliament must move itself into the 
spotUght. 
Australia must have ParUaments that run at least four 
years to achieve the rational commitment to reform and 
statesmanship so necessary in an era where every political 
decision is fine-tuned. Even in that great collage of interest 
groups, Bentley's United States, the longer term allows 
some signs of commitment in a president's early years. A 
four-year Parliament was proposed for Australia as late as 
1897, but failed to gain momentum. With a referendum in 
1992 we could achieve this for 1997. 
Parliament is crucial to the policy-making process; it 
must be revived for the twenty-first century in Australia. 
Quite apart from all its other roles, it is our crudest approx-
imation to "the public interest ", the repository of our sov-
ereignty, the answer to the the economist's cost/benefit 
analysis, the social impact statement, the environmental im-
pact statement. It is a primary vehicle for trade-offs of val-
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ues and resources, but it is not properly structured to per-
form this role. Most of the requisite changes require no con-
stitutional amendment. 
It is on the aspect of responsible government, but related 
to aU facets of the system of government in Australia, that 
the need for citizenship education arises. Citizenship educa-
tion in our schools in this country is virtuaUy non-existent, 
yet over one-half of our population come from countries 
with different systems. The Australian electorate is, as a re-
sult, ignorant of the proper roles and functions of the actors 
in our democracy and they are rarely enlightened by the 
media. If citizens have no inherent understanding of what 
constitutes good government, we must not be surprised if 
politicians respond accordingly. Citizenship education must 
be the top priority leading to 2001. 
Bureaucracy 
The progressive weakening of our system of responsible 
government has profound implications for public adminis-
tration, not least the role of the bureaucracy. Clearly, the 
dictum of our public servants being silent, permanent, 
anonymous and neutral no longer applies. We are rapidly 
severing the links through the political process between 
Cabinet and its bureaucrats, and turning once again to legal 
procedures to encapsulate that mystical relationship once 
known in the literature as the art of public administration 
rather than the science, especiaUy the relationship between 
the public servants and the government. There are a number 
of forces at work producing this trend: 
• It is part of a profoundly new approach to government 
based on pragmatism rather than ideology, which sees 
politicians argue that the private-sector methods are su-
perior in management and this momentum is highly con-
ducive in a post-stagflation environment of cutback upon 
cutback. 
• It is also part of a reflexive action by a public service 
which has seen unprecedented attacks upon it by minis-
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ters and Parliamentarians, and must turn to legal reme-
dies. The Westminster model makes no aUowance for 
this — it is an upward-looking model; all of its inherent 
logic is about upward flows of responsibility, no down-
ward lines of responsibUity from ministers and Parlia-
ment. Legalism and managerialism are something of a 
shield to ward off the arrows. 
It is a response to the recognition that Australia has a very 
high incidence of bureaucracy by world standards and 
central agencies find control more difficult, especially as 
the public service needs to become more diverse, 
specialised and less monolithic. 
It is part of worldwide reforms in thinking and practice 
regarding the role of the public sector itself. Today gov-
ernments in the First, Second and Third Worlds are 
privatising everything that moves, corporatising every-
thing that stands still and streamlining everything that is 
stagnant or falling apart. It says something rather pro-
found about the changing values of the world that a de-
veloping country in the late 1980s finds it difficult to 
secure a loan from international monetary agencies with-
out a privatisation program, whereas in the 1960s and 
1970s they were required to have a central five-year plan. 
Driven by both the ideology of the New Right and sheer 
managerialism, these concepts have tentatively invaded 
our shores. 
Privatisation and corporatisation 
It is quite amazing how easily ideas can be imported into 
Australia with so little scrutiny. We quarantine animals 
which come to this country, we spray aeroplanes, we frisk 
passengers, we impose tariffs on goods that come here and 
leave them sitting on wharves for months before we collect 
them. Why then is there no passport control for ideas from 
other countries; why can't they queue up at the barrier and 
be subject to a questioning of their credentials; why no bag-
gage control on concepts and techniques? This is one of the 
few areas where we can put our isolation to advantage. 
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Should we subject the current wave of managerialism to im-
port checks, the delays would not be so long. The results are 
in. In over sixty-eight countries of the world, privatisation 
has been found to have both upsides and downsides. By and 
large privatisation over the past decade around the world 
has reduced government indebtedness, increased govern-
ment revenue, shrunk the size of the public sector in gross 
domestic product, created more transparency in govern-
ment-industry relations, exposed cross-subsidies and other 
community service obligations, created higher individual 
share ownership, produced a decline in trade union mem-
bership, increased profitabUity for enterprises, caused over-
subscription for share offers, foUowed by substantial 
premiums in share prices, produced staggering increases in 
salaries for top executives and board members, increased 
unemployment in the economy, caused falls in the stan-
dards of some services, increased foreign ownership, re-
duced competition domestically, increased international 
competition, created a new battery of regulatory frame-
works and caused confrontation between enterprise and 
regulator. The essential difficulty is that, around the world, 
on those aspects of privatisation that can easily be mea-
sured, the poUcy of privatisation appears to be a resounding 
success, whereas on those aspects of it which are most heav-
ily criticised, there is little hard data available. 
Corporatisation does sharpen objectives, highlight com-
munity service obligations and produce greater accountabil-
ity. It remains to be seen whether it can institutionalise the 
separation between policy and management — one of the 
oldest dilemmas in the literature of public administration 
since the days of Woodrow WUson — and it is not certain 
whether it can stop politicians meddling in the affairs of 
corporatised airlines, banks, telecommunications authori-
ties, water boards or electricity corporations. As one car-
toonist captioned so succinctly in the middle of the timed 
telephone calls debate, "What is the cost of a local caU? One 
cabinet minister and one by-election. " 
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Streamlining public services 
It is in the streamlining that the results are less easily ap-
praised. Attempts to simply mimic private-sector tech-
niques have rarely worked in the public sector. Senior 
executive services (SES) have, by and large, fallen well short 
of expectations wherever they have been introduced: the 
requisite mobUity around the SES does not occur, the incen-
tives which can be offered in the public sector are never 
enough to positively encourage consistently better manage-
ment, middle management becomes disillusioned as regards 
the attention to the higher levels, whereas they are the ones 
who stoke and control the fires in the engine room; and 
contract employment itself becomes a recipe for political 
and managerial patronage. There should be no surprise 
about this; the logic of Northcote-Trevelyan still applies; the 
choice is still between a permanent and neutral civil service 
and a temporary but political civil service. There is far too 
much of a tendency in Australia to think of patronage as 
solely party-poUtical patronage. Patronage exists wherever 
a public servant gives a minister the advice he thinks the 
minister wants to hear rather than the advice he or she 
should hear. The old system has the virtue that it encourages 
frank and fearless advice more conducive to policy-making 
in the public interest. Moreover, now that we have capri-
ciously abolished our central personnel agencies, our public 
service boards, all around this country in the wave of 
managerialism Q. D. Story would have turned in his grave 
over that one), there is no focal point in our system to con-
cern itself with these problems. No whistleblowing agency 
can substitute for an active personnel agency headed by 
leaders and visionaries prepared to head the civil service in 
the old-fashioned sense of the world. There are no J. D. Sto-
rys in our current administrations in Australia, no body to 
concern itself about the welfare of pubUc employees them-
selves, as people, amidst the turmoil of their daily lives. The 
system would not faciUtate it, the more's the pity. 
I welcome the challenge posed by privatisation, 
corporatisation and mangerial streamlining in the public 
sector. There is much to commend it, but we have barely 
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begun to think these vital aspects through and select those 
components adaptable to our system. We do need elements 
of privatisation in Australia where only 7 per cent of the 
population owns shares, taxation schemes discriminate 
against employee share ownership and children grow up be-
lieving that they wiU always be employees rather than em-
ployers or entrepreneurs, with little personal and direct 
appreciation of the importance of productivity and effi-
ciency to the economy. But we must avoid the pitfalls of 
abuse of the public interest, short-term political gains at 
long-term public cost and the massive redistribution of 
wealth which has occurred elsewhere. Our thinking to date 
is too shallow on these matters, swept along by incremental-
ism, pragmatism and fixation about debt levels. Again our 
political cartoonists have done us a favour: as one encapsu-
lated the privatisation debate, "I have seen the light on the 
hUl; and I wondered how much we would get for it." 
Much of the problem we have in Australia in grappling 
with these concepts comes as a result of a particular gap in 
the Uterature of pubUc administration. We do have a won-
derful array of material on many facets through the work of 
Bland, Eggleston, WettenhaU, Corbett, Spann, Hughes, Par-
ker, Reid, Crisp and so many others, but one area where so 
little is known is the aspect crucial to the present debate and 
the next century. I am speaking of the motivation of public 
administrators. For the advocates of managerialism, whUe 
even conceding the defects of some of their concepts and 
techniques, stiU maintain that, at the end of the day, it is the 
culture, the ethos of management that sees private-sector 
approaches triumphant. It used to be the case in Australia 
that our top public-sector managers were motivated by the 
notion of serving the pubUc, being close to the action, hav-
ing adrenalin pumping through them from proximity to the 
political process. The whole Morrisonian logic and 
Robson's conceptualisation of public enterprise were for-
mulated on these aspects and we in Australia foUow Britain 
in this respect — those two words, "public enterprise", 
used to sum it all up. But what motivates our top public ser-
vants today? Is it really their legal contracts, their capacity 
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to set targets and achieve them, their codes of conduct, their 
supposedly greater freedom in resource deployment, their 
LTDs, their merit pay? Is Charles Lindblom correct in his ob-
servation of how the market disciplines businesspeople: 
'"Seals are easUy trained because they have an appetite for 
fish"? We simply don't know the answers to these ques-
tions. There is an urgent need for research on motivation of 
public-sector managers before this century is out. What 
does seem evident is the type of skills required in today's 
and tomorrow's mUieu. Whereas public administrators 
have always had to be a combination of Leonardo and Napo-
leon, today they also have to possess the skills of Mother 
Theresa and Fred Astaire. 
Whatever else, the desirable outcome for 2001 is an end, 
in public admiinistration, to the profound oscillations in 
systemic adaptation. No longer do we need the ten to fif-
teen-year cycle of pendulum swings between public interest 
and market dominance, no longer the profound shifts in 
attitude to decentralisation between let-the-managers-man-
age and tight central control. The twenty-first century in 
Australia shows every sign of shifting to the European 
mixed-enterprise mode, capturing in a more stable way the 
synergies of public- and private- sector ethos meshed in 
common institutional frameworks. Managers of the future 
would best be educated in the French mode, which pro-
duces enduring networks of common values and percep-
tions underpinning the delivery of services to citizens and 
smoothing the path of government business relations to 
make for a more vibrant economy. In Australian tertiary ed-
ucation models, this may well require a revisitation of eigh-
teenth and nineteenth century political economy as a focus 
for public policy analysis. The tragedy is that the discipline 
of economics and political science have drifted so far apart 
in the intervening years. Public administration can and does 
provide a meeting point. 
The trend of the 1990s has already begun to move away 
from rigid ideological approaches to policy questions. The 
concomitant shift to privatisation, already begun and on dis-
play for the next two days in Brisbane, may well have its 
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dangers, but it ought to create a springboard in con-
ceptualisation for the twenty-first century convergence of 
viewpoint harnessing the best features of waUet-oriented 
and pubUc-oriented management and a discarding of the 
worst features. At any event, in a nation of just 17 miUion 
people in a land with urUimited economic resources but se-
rious economic problems, it wiU seem increasingly absurd 
to adopt extreme polarised ideological positions on public-
private-sector relations. 
Republic? 
I have left untU the end the question of whether Australia 
should be a republic. The changes I have advocated hitherto 
are not dependent on Australia's becoming a republic. It was 
a matter that occupied the minds of our founding fathers. 
The matter was as complex then as it is now. Consider this 
piquant account from Quick and Garran re the 1890s: 
Some years ago a few ardent but irresponsibile advocates of 
Australian federation indulged in predictions that the time 
would inevitably come when Australia would separate from the 
mother country and become an independent republic. Those 
ill-considered utterances caused, at the time, strong expressions 
of disapproval throughout the colonies, which effectually pre-
vented the repetition of such suggestions, as being beyond the 
arena of serious contemplation and debate. Throughout the po-
litical campaign which preceded the election of the Federal 
Constitution, not a solitary public writer or speaker seriously 
discussed the possibility, much less the probability of separa-
tion.^^' 
Most of the nations which currently belong to the British 
Commonwealth are now republics, giving lie to the belief 
often floated throughout Australia that a constitutional 
monarchy is essential to remain in that international forum. 
The other arguments are well canvassed in the literature, as 
are the technical problems, including the key question of 
the nature of the republic itself. It would clearly require fun-
damental constitutional change of a kind rarely seen in 
peacetime. We have begun some small steps with a revoca-
tion of appeals to the Privy Council, full enforcement of the 
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Statute of Westminster, the declining importance of trading 
relationships with Britain, Britain's new complete absorp-
tion into Europe post-1992 and the diminution of her own 
sovereignty, the demise of the Westminster model (West-
minster is no longer a Westminster model itself), new reve-
lations of British attitudes to AustraUa in wartime, and the 
recent changes to our national anthem and cessation of the 
British honours system (both of these encouraged and 
blessed by the Queen herself). We still retain the flag, al-
though even in 1900, just before Federation, Banjo Paterson 
was writing: 
The English flag — it is ours in sooth 
We stand by it wrong or right. 
But deep in our hearts is the honest truth 
We fought for the sake of a fight. 
And the English flag may flutter and wave 
Where the World-wide Oceans toss, 
But the flag the Australian dies to save. 
Is the flag of the Southern Cross. 
If ever they want us to stand the brunt 
Of a hard-fought, grim campaign. 
We will carry our own flag up to the front 
When we go to the wars again. 
The arguments for a republic cannot be sustained on eco-
nomic grounds. Presidencies are infinitely more costly than 
monarchies to run and they don' t bring in a fraction of the 
tourism revenue. A vice-president in the wings is hardly 
preferable to an heir to the throne. No, it is on non-eco-
nomic grounds that the debate must be joined. I am, on bal-
ance, for a republic for the independence of spirit it would 
engender, the symbolism of nationalism in our myopic 
country so riddled with parochialism, the capacity it would 
afford to capture true multiculturalism which is a reality in 
the Australia of the late twentieth century, and the opportu-
nity it accords for our first citizens, the Aboriginal commu-
nity, to share in the construction of a new society. Freedom 
is so often a prerequisite to acceptance of responsibility and 
wiUingness to help shape one's destiny. Symbolic perhaps, 
but symbolism wUl be the key to the politics of the twenti-
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eth century as astounding communications technology per-
meates instant visual and auditory images throughout our 
human interrelationships. Australia is in need of a lot more 
genuine patriotism more lasting than the ephemeral senses 
of sporting events, wars and sporadic threats to our conti-
nent. Of course, we do not want xenophobia. Republican-
ism would gradually encourage that spirit of independence, 
maturity and resolve as a prerequisite to confronting the re-
alities of internationalisation pressures upon our political, 
social and economic institutions which wUl clearly charac-
terise the twentieth century. It could be achieved by 2001. 
Amendment 
A positive democracy requires good citizenship education, 
patriotism and fuU-blooded participation. It also requires re-
alistic processes for change. Clearly we are behind the 
Americans who have proposed amendments at a rate of 
forty per year for 200 years, or the Swiss to whom referen-
dums are as common as Saturday shopping in the supermar-
ket. The formal record in Australia seems dismal by 
comparison, just eight passed out of forty-two proposed to 
the people since Federation, and really only three of those 
have caused fundamental change. The amending formula 
was a last-minute compromise in the Australian Constitu-
tion, not being resolved until 1899 in favour of a popular 
referendum rather than decisions by state legislatures on the 
American model. The compromise was to have the two-
thirds of the states requirement and the option of either 
house, rather than both, being able to secure a referendum. 
The record is not as dismal as it seems; many of our failed 
referendums have come extremely close to success — at 
least 60 per cent of them, in fact. More referendums, not 
fewer, would accustom Australians to change. In addition, 
Michael Macklin, Geoffrey Walker and others are clearly 
correct on the need for a citizens' initiated referendum pro-
cess, a realistic one, to eradicate the apathy which is a more 
serious threat than ragweed, bruceUosis or the fruit fly to 
our continent. A nation which does not contain inherent 
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means of adaptation in its political institutions is bound to 
stagnate. There is nothing inherently wrong in the process 
of our referendums that a Uttle more honesty, a little more 
enthusiasm from government, a little more campaigning 
and a little more bipartisanship could not solve. One hun-
dred referendum questions in 2001, to celebrate a centenary 
of independence, might be an optimistic goal. 
External affairs 
No discussion of contemporary perceptions of a future Aus-
tralia would be complete without some attention to the ex-
ternal affairs power. For most of the 1890s, from the 1891 
BiU onwards. Section 51 , Sub-section 29 actuaUy extended 
to External "'Affairs and Treaties". The words, "'and 
Treaties" were omitted very late in the discussions at the 
suggestion of the Legislative Council of New South Wales, 
but the intention of the clause was to extend to the signing 
of treaties. Some constitutional analysts of the late nine-
teenth century predicted that this power would become a 
battleground. Thus W. Harrison Moore felt the power might 
be used: 
to establish the doctrine that, in the Courts of the Common-
wealth, Commonwealth Laws, like Acts of the Imperial Parlia-
ment, cannot be impunged on the ground that they reach 
beyond local affairs; in other words, the rule against laws 
intended' to operate 'exterritorially' will within the Common-
wealth be a rule of construction only, and not a rule in restraint 
of power.^^ 
However, very few of those at the various conferences 
and conventions believed the external affairs power would 
be interpreted as widely as this. It was simply, they be-
lieved, a case of the new federal goverrmient taking over 
most of the responsibility from the imperial Parliament for 
Australia's own external relations. 
As early as 1936, in the Burgess case, the external affairs 
power was revealed to be able to allow the federal govern-
ment to control intra-state air navigation when an eccentric 
stunt-flyer who flew under the Sydney Harbour Bridge 
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based his appeal on the Paris Air Convention. Today, of 
course, the external affairs power, through High Court in-
terpretation, allows the federal government to exercise 
power in areas that are otherwise within the jurisdiction of 
the states — racial discrimination, protection of heritage 
and the environment and organised crime — and it is here 
that the controversy arises. The situation comes about be-
cause the High Court, in a manner not known to many fed-
erations, is empowered to grant a large degree of supremacy 
for one clause of the constitution over others. It does the 
same with the finance power. Should anything be done 
about this? 
The reality of life is that Australia became inter-
nationalised at a rapid rate. It is necessary for us to take our 
place in the world. We have already signed many hundreds 
of international treaties on labour relations, human rights, 
higher education, economic affairs, cultural affairs, envi-
ronment and heritage and nuclear non-proliferation, includ-
ing the copyright convention which protects the words of 
those who criticise the external affairs power. We wiU sign 
hundreds more. We are citizens of the world. Only a few in-
ternational conventions make aUowances for federal coun-
tries to allow sub-national governments some say, so for the 
vast majority of cases, our national government wiU have to 
be signatory and possess the authority to represent Australia 
to the world. The states do dabble in international affairs, 
with agents' general offices, trade visits and agreements, ed-
ucational and cultural exchanges and the like. 
The truth of the matter is that, in almost all cases, the fed-
eral government has engaged in extensive dialogue and con-
sultation with the states before signing the international 
treaty and convention and, in most cases, requests the states 
to participate in the ongoing functioning of the treaty 
within Australia. For aU of the rhetoric and abuse directed at 
the World Heritage agreement, it is now operated by a piece 
of legislation deliberately designed by Gareth Evans and 
others (although it looks more like a design by Michelan-
gelo) to allow the states to be consulted, to allow them to 
nominate places, to appeal against nominations, to have a 
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position on the body which investigates any appeal and, 
even after aU of that, to go to the High Court for compensa-
tion if stUI aggrieved. Of course, all regulations issued under 
the World Heritage Properties Act are able to be debated in 
Parliament, including the Senate. The point is that, although 
it is true that, at the end of the day, the federal government 
can often gain augmented power by virtue of an interna-
tional treaty, it is nonetheless possible to ensure highly con-
sultative and democratic arrangements surrounding the use 
of the power. Moreover, the bodies which have been estab-
lished to manage arrangements based on the external affairs 
powers can and do provide for maximum involvement of 
the states. The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority is 
one of the world's finest examples of federal-state co-oper-
ation. In the new Wet Tropics Ministerial Council for the 
North Queensland Rainforests, the Queensland Minister is 
the Chairperson. 
It would, admittedly, be preferable if the federal govern-
ment did not have to use indirect means to achieve interna-
tional objectives. It would be better to amend the Australian 
Constitution to clarify the federal government's role in spe-
cific areas which have an international dimension. Clearly it 
is patently absurd for our national government to be 
honouring Australia's enviromental obligations by the use 
of indirect powers — external affairs, trade, corporations, 
export power and the Uke. If this cannot be achieved, and 
even if it can, it is not too difficult to surround each interna-
tional power with consultation procedures involving the 
states. If nationhood means anything, it means the capacity 
to speak with one voice on the world stage after due consul-
tation and policy input from aU those domestically affected. 
This wUl be the way of the twenty-first century. 
Conclusion 
Tomorrow, five men and two women begin an historic 
Premiers' Conference in Brisbane devoted to reform of 
some key aspects of our system of government. Next year, 
in less than six months' lime, comes the centenary of that 
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first Constitutional Convention in Sydney that set Australia 
on the path to nationhood. We have a decade in which to 
emulate the founding fathers, to design a system of govern-
ment suitable for the twenty-first century. The work of 
seven people, even seven governments, wUI not be enough. 
A popular debate is essential, a decade of education, infor-
mation, reflection, debate and action. 
As in the 1890s, the circumstances must be favourable for 
reform to occur. They had a depression and a number of 
strikes. Heaven knows that seems to be upon us already. 
They had the clear advantages of nationalism before them; 
we have internationalism, its opportunities, threats and 
chaUenges. They had the milieu of artists, musicians, poets 
and novelists appealing to popular national sentiment — we 
desperately need that element. They had the intellectuals, 
the pamphleteers, the Australian Natives' Association. The 
Australian academic community of today must contribute in 
this way; we are at times too distant from relevance, too re-
moved from discussion of practical issues, yet we have so 
much to offer from the privilege of independence. Our edu-
cation and training make us at times hypercritical of all that 
governments do when the truth is that an ounce of praise for 
politicians for the positive actions they perform has one 
hundred times the impact of a tonne of criticism for their 
follies. When Australian politicians behave like statesmen 
and stateswomen we should encourage them. 
In the years since Federation, Australians have turned 
back rivers to flow through mountain ranges, made penicil-
lin into a useable drug, produced some of the finest tele-
scopes on earth, invented Vegemite, the bionic ear, the 
pacemaker and airport radar, taken giant strides in solar en-
ergy, established distance education and vastly expanded 
telecommunications. We pioneered compulsory voting, 
votes for women and secret ballots. Our painters, dancers, 
film-makers, actors and musicians receive accolades around 
the world; we have produced five Nobel prizewinners. The 
point is that Australia's contribution can no longer be ex-
plained by Darwinism, no longer shaped entirely by the fac-
tors of our existence, our distance and our climate. Our 
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successes are now shaped by human ingenuity and realisa-
tion of our human potential. Surely it is not beyond us to de-
sign a new system of government appropriate for our 
nation. 
Most important of all, Australia still has a unifying factor, 
a rallying force, an epigrammatic focal point to carry us to 
2001 and beyond. It was a phrase given to us by Parkes him-
self at that historic banquet in Melbourne just four months 
after Tenterfield. At the banquet, the speaker before Parkes 
cast a pessimistic note on the prospects for Federation by 
mentioning the lion in the path that must be slain or it will 
slay us all. He was referring to inter-state tariffs, the precur-
sor to Section 92, the clause of the AustraUan Constitution 
over which there has indeed been more litigation than any 
other clause in our constitution. 
Parkes, in a spontaneous, inspiring response, gave his 
reply to the negative, the cynical and the vested interests 
against nationhood, using words which are most relevant 
today, words that can overcome for us differences between 
federal and state, resolve Aboriginal rights, enrich multi-
culturaUsm and address our two greatest needs for 2001: in-
creased international thinking and decreased parochialism. 
The words: 
The crimson thread of kinship runs through us all. 
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TENTERFIELD REVISITED 
What should Australia's system of government be like in the 21st 
Century? Should Australia be a Republic? Should the states be 
abolished or more states created? Does Australia need a Bill of 
Rights? Should state and local governments have more taxing pow-
ers? How should Aboriginal rights and freedoms be addressed? Is 
there scope for privatisation and corporatisation of government ser-
vices? How can parliament be reformed to provide for democratic 
scrutiny? 
Now is the time to address these questions as Australia cele-
brates 100 years since Sir Henry Parkes introduced the principles 
upon which the Constitution was written and the nation was 
founded, beginning with his famous speech at Tenterfield in 1890. 
The founding fathers entered into a decade of spirited public de-
bate and discussion to bring together six disparate, untrusting and 
competitive colonies under the banner of nationalism; the chal-
lenge of the 1990s is to emulate their efforts and devise a system of 
government that will allow Australia to take its place in the world. 
Kenneth Wiltshire addresses these issues and provides a vision 
for Australia's system of government in the 21st Century. 
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